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MANDATORY DEDICATION OF PLAYGROUNDS AND
PARKS IN RESIDENTIAL SUBDIVISIONS
As our cities continue their sprawl into surrounding rural land,
there is an increasing awareness of the inadequacy of the playgrounds
and parks in these new areas. There seems to be little controversy
over the importance and desirability of playgrounds and parks;'
the basic problem lies in devising a method of providing adequate
facilities for new residential areas. One possible method involves
mandatory dedication by subdividers as a condition precedent to
the filing of a subdivision plat.2 The purpose of this note is to
consider the constitutionality of mandatory dedication, with particular
reference to the Kentucky law on the subject, as well as to offer
possible alternatives.
SUBDirMIoN CONROL IN GmENA
1. Definition
Subdivision control "relates to the way in which land is divided
and made ready for building development."3 Such control is based
upon the older platting statutes which required a survey and a
recordation of a plat map. Through state enabling acts, local gov-
erning units have been given the authority to impose certain require-
ments which must be met before the plats can be recorded.4 Sub-
division control is intimately related to zoning; both are manifesta-
tions of police power designed to deter community blight and to
direct future growth. Zoning regulates the type of building develop-
ment which can take place on the land; subdivision control regu-
I Planning Advisory Service Rept. #46 1 (Jan. 1953): It has long been agreed
that accessible parks, playgrounds and schools are as necessary to a good living
environment as are proper densities and compatible land uses. Cities are per-
mitted the construction of new residential areas, which though good or excellent in
residential structure, are lacking in the environmental features which result in
wholesome and enduring neighborhoods. One characteristic of the slums in
many cities is its inadequate park and playground space; and one lesson that the
slum has taught us is that once subdivision and development have taken place, it
is virtually impossible for the city to provide that open space without either de-
molishing buildings or completely redeveloping the area.
2 Other methods:
(a) voluntary dedication by developers-This is an unrealistic method and
has been carried out by only a few subdividers,
(b) reservation of property either voluntary or mandatory-This method is
provided for in Ky. Rev. Stat. 100.362, 100.790 to 100.830 (hereinafter
cited as KRS), but has never been used, due mainly to lack of funds,
(c) urchase by city or county, before or after subdivision is developed. This
has been used some, but has been limited in use due to insufficient funds.
8 Melli, Subdivision Control in Wisconsin, 1953 Wis. L. Rev. 389.
4 According to Haar, Land Use Planning 347 (1959) and 28 Ind. L.J. 544
(1952), forty-nine states have subdivision statutes, thirty-nine vesting control in




lates the way in which the land is divided and made ready for build-
ing development. At least one writer has emphasized the fact that
through subdivision control the city has its best opportunity to con-
trol its growth in a manner which will benefit the community as a
whole.5 The early enabling acts were aimed mainly at street pat-
terns; however, thirty-two states presently require physical improve-
ments on the land such as curbs, sidewalks, sewers, and surfaced
streets-all at the subdivider's expense."
2. Social Justification
In justifying why a land owner should be compelled to obtain
the approval of a government agency before he can subdivide his
land and to provide improvements at his own expense, the courts
have stressed the fact that everyone concerned receives some bene-
fit.7 The community is benefited by the protection of its interest in
assuring the permanence of new developments, by the adequacy of
facilities for future services, and by health and fiscal safeguards-
all without the prohibitive cost of acquiring the property by con-
demnation. The home buyer and mortgage lender are protected in
their investment by being reasonably assured that the property will
keep its value. The subdivider is also protected in a sense from
possible financial ruin which might well result from excessive sub-
division.
8. Constitutionality
The power of state legislatures to enact statutes requiring filing
of subdivision plats is commonly recognized." Generally, the validity
of any particular regulations which act as conditions precedent
to the recording of the plats has depended upon the legislative author-
ization or upon the reasonableness of the regulation. The courts
have generally upheld regulations which require the subdivider to
make such improvements as grading streets and installing utilities
as being reasonable regulations by the community.9 Some courts have
strictly limited the conditions to be imposed to those specified in
the enabling legislation. For example, under a statute referring only
to direction and width of streets, the Minnesota court held that no
requirement for grading streets could be made.10 Also, the New
Jersey court has held that in the absence of enabling authority the
5 Webster, Urban Planning and Municipal Public Policy, ch. 9 (1958).
628 Ind. L.J. 544, 554 (1952).
7 Melli, Subdivision Control in Wisconsin, 1953 Wis. L. Rev. 389.
8 Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 524 (1950).9 Allen v. Stockwell, 210 Mich. 488, 178 N.W. 27 (1920).




municipality had no power to require sidewalks, curbs, and gravel
roadways." However, the general rule appears to be that when
there is express statutory authority to impose conditions precedent,
the limits on what conditions can be required will be broadly con-
strued as long as they are imposed for the good of the community.'
2
This rule was well illustrated in a recent Wisconsin case in which
the court held that a municipality could require a subdivider to make
and install, as a condition of its approval of the subdivision plat,
any public improvements reasonably necessary.
18
In upholding reasonable subdivision regulations as not constituting
a taking of property without due process of law, the courts have
based their holdings on three theories.14 First, reasonable conditions
are a valid exercise of the police power and not an exercise of the
power of eminent domain. The state or its representative has the
power to prescribe regulations relating to the health, safety, morals
and general welfare of the people. This power is sometimes classi-
fied into two categories: 15 (a) where the state regulates perform-
ance of certain acts by others such as in zoning or requiring certain
professions to be licensed; (b) where the State acts affirmatively in
taking or destroying private property because of an emergency. 1
State action under either category is not considered as taking property
for a public use, and thus the individual incurring the loss is not
entitled to compensation as he would be under eminent domain pro-
ceedings. The rationale of the courts in holding that conditions
precedent may be imposed before plats can be recorded as a valid
exercise of the police power is as follows: where the State requires
the individual to act affirmatively, it is a valid exercise of police power,
even though it involves a substantial expenditure by the individual;
17
in subdivision control, the one seeking to have the plat recorded
or subdivision approved is the one who takes the affirmative step;
therefore, as long as the requirements are reasonable, conditions
precedent to the recording or approval of the plat may be imposed
under the police power.' 8 The second theory used by the courts is
that subdivision regulations, even those requiring dedication, do not
11 Magnolia Dev. Co. v. Coles, 10 N.J. 223, 89 A.2d 664 (1952).
22 MeMl, Subdivision Control in Wiscosin, 1953 Wis. L. Rev. 389 399.
'3 Zastrow v. Village of Brown Deer, 9 Wis.2d 100, 100 N.W.2d 399 (1960).
14 Beuscher, Materials on Land Use Controls VII: 22 (1958).
15 Annot., 86 A.L.R. 1523 (1983).
16Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16 (1879) (Property destroyed to stop
spread of fire).
17Lehigh Valley R.R. Co. v. Board of Public Utl. Comm's., 278 U.S. 24
(1928); New York & N.E. R.R. v. Bristol, 151 U.S. 556 (1894).
18 Newton v. American Sec. Co., 201 Ark. 943, 148 S.W.2d 311 (1941);
Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Adv. Cal. 29, 207 Pac.2d 1 (1949);
Ridgefield Land Co. v. Detroit, 241 Mich. 668, 217 N.W. 58 (1928).
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take property unconstitutionally because the landowner can, if he
desires, refuse to plat. He still has his land and can sell it as un-
platted real estate.' The third theory used by the courts is that
regulation of land subdivision guards against fraud and sharp prac-
tices.2
0
SUBDIVISION CoNTRoLs REQun DxicATioN OF LAND
1. In General
Dedication of land for public use may be accomplished by two
methods, common law dedication and statutory dedication.21 In com-
mon law dedication the public receives an easement on the property
"dedicated" by the owner without compliance with any statute or
regulation. In statutory dedication, the city obtains title to the
property through the owner's compliance with the statute or regu-
lation requiring such dedication. The problem of subdivision controls
requiring dedication of land to the public lies entirely within the
statutory method.
The earlier subdivision controls did not generally require dedica-
tion of land, but as the courts began to uphold requirements of
street plans and public improvements as a valid exercise of the
police power, more and more conditions precedent were added to
subdividers' burdens, including those requiring dedication of land.
Dedication of land was first required in connection with streets,
which was upheld by the courts as a valid exercise of the police




The leading case standing for the proposition that it is within
the police power to require a subdivider to dedicate land is Ayres
v. City Council of Los Angeles.23 There the court announced the
broad rule that where no specific restriction or limitation on the city's
power is contained in the charter and none forbidding the particular
conditions is included either in the Subdivision Map Act or the city
ordinances, it is proper to conclude that conditions are lawful which
are not inconsistent with the Map Act and the ordinances and are
reasonably required by the subdivision type and use as related
to the character of local and neighborhood planning and traffic
conditions. The court recognized that such dedications would en-
10 Newton v. American Sec. Co., 201 Ark. 943, 148 S.W.2d 311 (1941).2 0 Matter of Sidebothain, 12 Cal.2d 434, 85 P.2d 453 (1938).2 1 Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 524, 546 (1950).
22oss v. U.S. ex rel Goodfellow, 7 App. D.C. 1, 10-11 (1895); Newton
v. American See. Co., 201 Ark. 943, 148 S.W.2d 311 (1941); Ridgefield Land
Co. v. Detroit, 241 Mich. 468, 217 N.W. 58 (1928).
2334 Adv. Cal. 29, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
19621
KNTUICKY LAW JOURNAL
able a city, through long-range planning, to provide for future growth
without the prohibitive cost of acquiring the necessary property by
condemnation.
While the Ayres case on its facts does not stand for the proposition
that a municipality can require dedication of land for a park or
playground, if the court's broad ruling is followed, then, presumably,
other courts would uphold such requirement, even though the en-
abling legislation did not directly provide for such dedication. The
Ayres case stands in direct opposition to the cases holding that the
approving body of the municipality is to be strictly limited to the
standards or conditions specified in the enabling legislation.24 This
contrast might well be explained in terms of the enabling acts of the
states involved, for California has gone far beyond the other states
in granting broad powers to Los Angeles as an autonomous unit.25
There has been very little litigation on the issue of requiring dedi-
cation of parks and playgrounds due to the fact that developers
usually decide not to go to court but to do it the municipality's way
so they can get on with the business of selling lots and homes. 26 Two
New York decisions involving the requirement of dedication of parks
and playgrounds have recognized the validity of the requirement.
27
The only case in which a court has broadly stated it unconstitu-
2 4 Tuxedo Homes v. Green, 258 Ala. 494, 63 So.2d 812 (1953) (The city
engineer in absence of statutory authorization could not require installation of a
lift pump for sewer.)- Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 Ill.2d 448, 167
N.E.2d 230 (1960) (Ordinance requiring every plat by which land was sub-
divided to dedicate to public for educational purpose 'such areas as might be
deemed necessary by plan commission to facilitate establishment of school facili-
ties convenient to subdivision" was invalid, because ordinance was broader than
statute which authorized municipalities to establish plan commissions and be-
cause ordinance was broader than statute which authorized municipalities to estab-
lish plan commissions and because ordinance fixed no standards whatever to
govern plan commission in determining amount of land to be dedicated.); State
ex rel. Lewis v. City Council of Minneapolis, 140 Minn. 433, 168 N.W. 188
(1910) (The city could not require grading under statute referring only to
direction and width of streeth.); Magnolia Dev. Co. v. Coles, 10 N.J. 223, 89
A.2d 664 (1952) (The municipality had no power to require sidewalks, curbs,
gutters, and gravel roadway, in absence of enabling authority.).
25 Cal. Gonst. §11: "Any county, city, town or township may make and en-
force within its limits all such . . . police . . . regulations as are not in conflict
with the general laws." This can be contrasted with the grant by the Kentucky
legislature which delegates police power to municipalities only to the extent that
it is expressly delegated by the legislature. Jones v. Russell, 224 Ky. 390, 6
S.W.2d 4160 (1928).
26 Beuscher, supra note 14 at 44.
2 7 In Reggs Homes, Inc. v. Dickerson, 179 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1958), the court,
in holding that a planning board was without power to extract a fee at the rate of
fifty dollars per building plot to be allocated to the town park fund said by
way of dictum, that the planning board could require inclusion of park facilities
in a pproving a new plat. In Ward v. City of New Rochells, 197 N.Y.S.2d 64
(1959), the court, in holding that a dedication of twenty per cent of the land
to be subdivided for educational purposes was sufficient to meet the require-
ment of ten per cent of the land to be dedicated for recreational purposes, as-
sumed the validity of the dedication requirement.
[Vol. 50
tional to require subdividers to dedicate land for playgrounds and
parks as a condition precedent to the filing or recording of a plat
is Pioneer Trust Say. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect.2 However,
a closer examination of the case indicates that the decision turned
more on the facts involved than on the abstract constitutional issue.
The court emphasized the fact that there was no evidence that a
school which was to be built on the land dedicated only secondarily
as a playground, would be necessary to the needs of the residents of
the subdivision. To the contrary, it appeared that the present school
facilities were near capacity-a situation which would be remedied
by the building of a new public school on the subdivider's dedicated
land. The court said that such mandatory dedication violated the
rule of reasonableness-for the burden cast upon the subdivider was
not specifically and uniquely attributable to the subdivider's ac-
tivity. Thus it was not shown that the residents of the new sub-
division would receive the primary benefit and the court did not
feel that the subdivider should pay the total cost of remedying the
school problem.
Massachusetts and Puerto Rico, in anticipation of regulations
requiring dedication, have enacted statutes providing that no such
requirements can be made upon the subdivider unless he receives
compensation.2 9 These provisions are contra to the trend of requir-
ing more and more from the subdivider and might well be explained
by the reasoning used by Justice Holmes in the case of Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon:
The protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment presup-
poses that it [land] is wanted for public use, but provides that it
shall not be taken for such use without compensation. . . . When
this seemingly absolute protection is found to be qualified by the
police power, the natural tendency of human nature is to extend the
qualification more and more until at last private property disap-
pears. But that cannot be accomplished in this way under the con-
stitution of the United States. . . . We are in danger of forgetting
that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not
28 176 N.E.2d 799 (IlM. 1961).
29 Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 41, §810 (1953):
No rule or regulation shall require, and no planning board shall impose
as a condition for the approval of a plan of a subdivision, that any of
the land within said subdivision be dedicated to the public use, or con-
veyed or released to the commonwealth or to the county, city or town
in which the subdivision is located, for use as a public way, public
park or playground, or for any other purpose, without just compensa-
tion to the owner thereof.
Planning Rules and Regulations for Puerto Rico, art. 55 (1952):
Due consideration shall be given to the allocation of suitable areas for
schools, parks and playgrounds. At least five per cent . . . of the total
of every proposed subdivision, involving the establishment of a new




enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the
constitutional way of paying for the change.30
In summary, there seems to be no direct case authority holding
that it is constitutional to require subdividers to dedicate part of their
land for playgrounds and parks, but neither is there binding authority
to the contrary. The courts might easily hold either way, permitting
such dedications by using the reasoning of the Ayres case to put
such dedications within the police power, or prohibiting them by
using the reasoning of the Miller case and drawing the line at dedi-
cation of streets or by calling the mandatory dedication unreasonable
as in the Pioneer case. In view of the extensive use of mandatory
dedications, a decision on its basic constitutionality is sorely needed.
3. Kentucky Law
Assuming that it is constitutional under the police power to use
subdivision controls to require subdividers to dedicate land for play-
grounds and parks, the next problem is whether, under the Ken-
tucky enabling legislation, the municipalities' planning commissions
are delegated sufficient power to require such dedication as a condi-
tion precedent for recording subdivision plats. The Kentucky statutes
applicable to all classes of cities require that a plat of all or any
land to be subdivided within the planning area be submitted to the
planning commission for its approval, which must be obtained be-
fore the plat can be recorded by the clerk.3' The enabling act gives
the planning commission of the cities of each class the power to make
rules and regulations, which would include subdivision control to
enforce their planning measures.3 2 The enabling act also provides
what the subdivision controls in each class city should contain. For
first class cities, KRS 100.087 provides:
The original subdivision control regulations . . . shall provide for:
(c) adequate and convenient open spaces for traffic, utilities, recre-
ation, light and air, and access for firefighting apparatus.
For second class cities, KRS 100.360(8) provides:
All plans, maps, regulations, and restrictions adopted by the com-
mission shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive design
to promote the public health, safety, morals or general welfare, by
. . . facilitating the adequate provision of transportation, water,
sewerage, schools, parks, playgrounds or other public requirements.
For third through sixth class cities, KIRS 100.740(1) provides:
30 260 U.S. 93. 415 (1922).
30 KS 100.088, 100.092 (first class cities); KRS 100.360, 100.364 (second
class cities); KRS 100.730 (third through sixth class cities). For a complete dis-
cussion see 48 Ky. L.J. 252 (1960).
32 KRS 100.032 (first class cities and counties containing first class cities);
KRS 100.350 (second class cities); KRS 100.530 (third through sixth class
cities).
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The [subdivision] regulations may provide for the proper arrange-
ment of streets, for adequate and convenient open spaces for traffic,
utilities, access of fire fighting apparatus, recreation, light and air,
and for the avoidance of congestion of population, including min-
imum width and area of lots.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has consistently held that
municipalities of the state possess police power only to the extent
it may be delegated to them by the legislature.33 It is hard to tell
from a reading of the statutes whether the power to require dedica-
tion of playgrounds and parks has been delegated to municipalities
since the enabling act does not speak in terms of mandatory dedi-
cation of playgrounds and parks. The term, "playgrounds and parks,"
is not even mentioned in the provisions for first and third through
sixth class cities, which speak rather of "open spaces for recreation."
The second class city provision mentions playgrounds and parks but
only to provide that the regulations should facilitate the provision
of such playgrounds and parks. To determine whether the legisla-
ture intended mandatory dedication of playgrounds and parks to
be within the scope of subdivision regulations, it becomes necessary
to look at other related provisions in the enabling act. KRS 100.860(1)
& (2) indicates that mandatory dedication was intended, for it pro-
vides for the acceptance by a second class city of the dedication of
a "street or other public ground." 4 This intention is also borne out
by the fact that while a detailed system for payment of land reserved
by a city is provided for,35 no such system is set up for land dedi-
cated to the city.
Clearly, there needs to be a ruling by the court deciding
whether the Kentucky enabling act delegates sufficient power to the
municipalities to require dedication of playgrounds and parks as a
condition precedent for recording subdivision plats.
Two SUGGESTED ALTERNATVE METHODS FOR AcQUrunG
PLAYGROUNDS AND PARKS
The first alternative method, as suggested by the Housing and
Home Finance Agency, provides that the planning commission
3
3 E.g., Jones v. Russell, 224 Ky. 890, 6 S.W.2d 460 (1928).
3 4 KRS 100.360(l):
All plats .. . and all instruments of dedication of land for public use,
shal be submitted to the commission and approved by it ....
KRS 100.360(2):
No street or other public ground shown on a subdivision plat... within
the planning area shall be accepted by the city or county unless the
plat and location have been approved by the commission. The legisla-
tive body may submit to the commission an ordinance proposing to
accept the dedication of any unapproved street or ground. ...
35KRS 100.790 to 100.830 (third through sixth class cities); KRS 100.362
(second class cities).
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make its neighborhood or community plans, designating in a general
way the nature and extent of the open spaces.36 Then, as any portion
of this planned area comes to be submitted for subdivision approval,
the planning commission would take steps to cause the dedication of
the recreational spaces at or about the places designated in the
plan, and compensate the owner of any subdivided tract for the excess
contributed by him above his fair share. In ascertaining the sub-
divider's fair share, the planning commission would try to determine
the recreation area needed by the number of people the subdivider
is bringing into the community.3 Thus the subdivider would be
getting some compensation and all subdividers would be subject
to equal standards.
The second alternative method would involve the planning com-
mission's requiring a certain percentage of open space for each plot
of ground subdivided. The subdivider could then meet this re-
quirement either by keeping his lot sizes much larger than neces-
sary, or by dedicating a playground or park and then cutting down
on lot sizes and set back requirements. This method would involve
no greater expense on the subdivider and the market would prob-
ably show a greater demand for houses in a subdivision with a play-
ground or park than it would for houses in a subdivision without
them. Thus, the subdivider would be encouraged to dedicate some of
the required open space for a playground or park.38
S. Roy Woodall, Jr.
3 6 Housing & Home Finance Agency, Suggested Land Subdivision Regula-
tions (1952).3 7 Tis can be based on standards of people to play area as compiled by
National Recreation Association, 315 Fourth Ave., N.Y. 10 N.Y. in their pub-
lication, Standards for Neihborhood Recreation Areas ad Facilities and Play
Space in New Neighborhoori.
38 A similar method is described by the architect, Peter Blake, in an article
in the May, 1961 issue of Horizon entitled, "The Ugly America:"
The mess that is suburban America starts with the sentimental as-
sumption that everybody should live in a detached house on a small
lot. The most common residential 'unit today is a single house of
about 1,000 square feet placed on a lot that is 60 feet wide along the
street and about 120 feet deep. The house is set back some 25 feet
from the sidewalk and about 10 feet from each of the side lines of the
property. Because the owners have but limited resources of time and
money, they often improve only that part of their lot which represents
their 'front to the outside world. These front yards are, of course,
unusable for outdoor living because common restrictions against fenses
rob them of all privacy. The rear yard is frequently neglected, and
in any case, it is not really big enough for growing children to play in.
So the children play in the street; the parents spend most of their
time on maintaining a front garden which they can't use; the com-
munity has to maintain long roads and long utility lines to service its
strung-out houses; and the suburbs go broke.
There is a better way. It is entirely possible to build 1,000-square-foot,
(Continued on next page)
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(Footnote continued from preceding page)
two-story houses on lots that measure only 20 feet wide by 50 feet deep.
Such houses would be attached to one another, yet staggered so that
each would have a completely private patio space of its own, big enough
for large outdoor parties and small enough for any family to maintain
without trouble. The 'surplus land' thus saved-something like 6,000
square feet per family-could then be pooled to create several large
communal parks each maintained by a small annual contribution for
member families. This sort of plan not only preserves much of the
natural beauty of the areas that surround our cities but also reduces
the cost of roads and utilities and, thus, the suburban tax-burden.
None of this is theory; it has been practiced for years in every Western
country including occasionally, the United States. Baldwin Hills, Los
Angeles, was built twenty years ago along the lines described above;
today it is the most desirable middle-income community in Southern
Califorma.
